by Dale Berry, Editor, michiganrailroads.com
On July 5, 1936, an eastbound Michigan Central (NYC) passenger train on the main line near Wayne Junction derailed at a broken passing track switch and struck the rear of a freight train which had pulled into the siding. The switch was determined to be defective. One employee was killed, three passengers were injured as were two other employees.
This accident was well documented in the Interstate Commerce Commission investigation in cooperation with the Michigan Public Utilities Commission and gives interesting details of the MC's signaling system on its main line in the mid-1930's.
Passenger train No. 40 had left Jackson on time, but was following freight train "Second JS-2" as it approached Ann Arbor about 3:00 a.m. It was the dispatcher's intention to have the freight train enter a passing siding so that the passenger train, heading to Detroit, would not be delayed.
It should be noted that in 1936, there were no two-way radios and all communications with engineers and conductors were the responsibility of station operators using written orders and line-side signals. The MC was double-tracked between Jackson and Detroit at this time and they had perhaps a dozen eastbound or westbound passing sidings along the route. Freight trains were usually put into these sidings to allow faster passenger and express trains to pass. Most of these sidings had "head-in" signals, turned on and off by local operators, which instructed the oncoming train to get in the siding and return the switches the for main line operation. [Note: By the 1960's, these take siding signals were controlled by the dispatcher himself, using a selector system on the dispatcher's telephone circuit].
The night operator at Ypsilanti testified before the ICC that the dispatcher told him to display the "head-in" signal for the freight train as it approached his station but the signal failed to operate properly due to the bulb being burned out. He then tried to hand up a message with the instructions for the freight train to head in at the Wiard siding, but afterwards found that the train order hoop had dropped with the message still attached to it. The passenger train was still behind the freight.
The towerman at Wayne Junction then received instructions from the dispatcher to display the eastbound head-in signal for the freight train at the passing siding just west of the tower. The freight train followed the instructions and entered the siding. The flagman attempted to close the switch for the oncoming passenger train but the switch was defective. It would not fully close, but the signal system indicated that it had closed. All of the signals on the MC main line had automatic train stop devices which would normally stop any train that tried to pass a restricted signal. Unfortunately, the signal system did not detect the defective switch and the train stop device did not stop the locomotive.
The signals directly involved in this accident west of the Wayne passing track are automatic block signals 192, 202 and 214, about one mile apart. (Note that these signal numbers represented the approximate milepost of the signal - example: signal 192 was at milepost 19.2) These signals were upper-quadrant, 3-position, semaphore type signals which are approach lighted (normally dark until a train enters the block). In addition, these three signals are equipped to display three-block indications by the addition of a yellow target light to the left of the signal mast, below the semaphore arm. The indications which could be displayed by these signals are:
The additional yellow light to the left of the signal mast was referred to by the ICC as a "Double-distant signal". Under this signal at 202, there is a take-siding signal controlled from the interlocking tower operator at Wayne Junction and it was arranged to display a flashing red light.
Turnout switches were equipped with switch circuit controllers adjusted to open the contacts when the switch points on both sides of the switch were open more than ¼ inch. This would set signals red.
Commentary
The Michigan Central railroad was always known to be an early adopter of technology which allowed increased train speed, more capacity, and improved safety on its railroad. Now firmly established in the New York Central (NYC) System as of 1930, the railroad had a modern signaling system on its main line between Detroit and Chicago, the busiest passenger and freight line in Michigan.
Double Distant Automatic Signals. The MC deployed their automatic block signals before 1900. They originally experimented with Hall "Banjo" signals (image at left), and soon moved to lower quadrant semaphore signals. By 1936, these automatic signals were separated by track blocks of about 1 mile. MC freight trains during this period were up to 60-80 cars (about 3,500 feet long) and permitted to operate at 40 to 50 mph. Passenger trains were smaller but faster, reaching 80 mph except around curves or through towns. The smaller 1-mile long blocks improved capacity of the line but were a problem for 80 mph passenger trains or freight trains which might not be able to stop within a mile. As a result, the MC changed to "double distant" block signals, adding a second "yellow" signal on the mast to give an approaching train about two miles to stop.
By comparison, the Pere Marquette single track line between Plymouth and Grand Rapids during this period used two-mile long blocks and normally only single target indication, except in unusual locations where a second indicator was added.
During this time period, the automatic block signal system (ABS) on the MC main line was single direction. Westbound signals were on the No. 1 (north) main, and eastbound signals were on the No. 2 (south) main. Crossovers were located at most stations, however trains were not permitted to run against the current of traffic (i.e. westbound on the eastbound main) without a train order granting that right from the dispatcher.
Head-In Signals. The MC had long passing sidings about every 8-10 miles on both the east and westbound double track main line to Chicago. This allowed slower freight trains to get out of the way of faster passenger and express trains. Though dispatchers in Jackson were in charge, they had no two-way radios during this period. They sent their instructions by telephone to agents and operators in stations and towers along the line. Some freight engineers and conductors knew to avoid the schedule of a first-class passenger train and pulled into the appropriate siding on their own, with the ABS signal system protecting the rear of their train if they were unable to get into the clear in time. Once they were in and clear, they called the dispatcher to report their status using a line-side telephone booth at the switch.
Dispatchers could also call the nearby tower or station operator and have them turn on a "take-siding" signal, which instructed the engineer to pull into the next siding. In this case, the Ypsilanti operator controlled the head-in signal for the eastbound siding at Wiard (near Willow Run) but the bulb had burned out. He then tried to hand up a written order to the engineer, but the engineer didn't see it for some reason. The next option for the dispatcher was to use a siding at Wayne Junction. The tower operator at Wayne Junction (a Pere Marquette crossing) controlled the head-in signals for both east and west bound sidings. He turned on the take-siding light and the train entered the siding, clearing the main line.
Inductive Train Stop. The MC/NYC also used automatic inductive train stops (ATS) at all main line block signals. The Interstate Commerce Commission ordered the installation of ATS in 1926 after a series of fatal train accidents. An ATS inductor was installed on a tie on the right side of the rail about 100 feet in front of each signal. Each locomotive had an ATS receiver on the tender axle to receive the ATS signal. There was also a "forestall" lever near the engineer in the cab of the locomotive. Images at left: 1) ACS trackside inductor. 2) Tender mounted receiver.
If the block signal was green (indicating proceed), no action was required by the engineer. But if the signal was displayed restricted or stop (yellow or red) and the engineer wished to continue forward, he had to hold down the forestall lever while passing the inductor. If the lever was not held down, the ATS system on the tender "dumped" the air on the train creating an emergency stop. The only way to restart the train after the air dump was for the engineer to climb down, walk back to the tender, and press the reset lever on the ATS. This would allow him to restore the brake line air which would take several minutes. This also required a notification to the road foreman at the end of the trip.
The purpose of ATS was to prevent read-end or interlocker crossing collisions and I'm sure it did that in many cases. But it wasn't fool proof because the ATS was only 100' from the signal and train speeds were often high. Occasionally, engineers fell asleep and didn't observe the signal.
Siding Switch Control. Today, most switches in signaled or CTC territory have locks which are integrated into the signal system. They also have facing point locks which insure that the switch is fully closed. That was not the case on the MC in 1936. An errant bolt was caught between the rails of the switch points preventing full closure. Unfortunately, the signal system didn't get the message and signals indicating "proceed" were presented for the eastbound main line. Just five years before this crash, the MC had a terrible accident at Town Line (in Dearborn) where a mis-informed telegraph operator changed a switch into the yard right in front of a 50 mph passenger train. The train derailed and tipped over, and it was a miracle that no one was seriously hurt. In the Town Line incident, the switch position successfully changed the approach signal from green to yellow (slow speed to enter the yard), but there was no lock or run-off timer to prevent changing the switch in front of the train. See ICC report here.
Broken switches led to many calamities on the Michigan Central and they apparently were slow to adopt new technology to prevent this. In the case of ATS, the MC (and many other railroads) didn't adopt it until being ordered by the ICC to do so. This was in the midst of the great Depression and capital funds were lacking no doubt to make many of these improvements.
The following sources are utilized in this website. [SOURCE-YEAR-MMDD-PG]:
